As commissioned to demonstrate the feasibility of jet propulsion, the E28/39 needed to exceed the performance of contemporary fighters. But Carter, the chief designer, took the opportunity to look further ahead, and devised an aircraft in which the onset of compressibility effects was taken into account from the beginning of the design. Successful operation over a wide speed range required a shrewd synthesis of previous experience and practice with uncertain material emerging from the research domain. The resulting aircraft showed no significant aerodynamic vices, requiring only minor modifications from its first flight to its participation in diving trials, that took it into hitherto unexplored regions of high subsonic speed. It proved to be fully worthy of its pivotal role at the beginning of a new era in aeronautics.
In the literature that has been compiled on the aircraft hitherto, there has been little critical comment on the aerodynamic aspects of the design. The notebooks which would have recorded the reasons for design decisions are not among the scattering of papers which are so far known to have survived Gloster's summary dissolution in 1963. But it is apparent that Carter had seen from his first study that the new type of engine provided the potential to obtain a remarkable leap in performance, especially at altitude. The new engine would require a new type of aeroplane. Outlining his first ideas in a Company brochure (10) , he recognised that the potential performance would not be reached without achieving 'a high degree of aerodynamic perfection'. The piston-engine/propeller combination was already taking aircraft occasionally into regions where compressibility effects were becoming noticeable, but they would now become assertive. The manner in which these, and other aerodynamic factors, were first taken into account in the design of the E28, and especially in the light of the developing state of knowledge at the time, forms an intriguing subject for study.
INITIAL IDEAS
Gloster Aircraft Company had become part of the Hawker Siddeley Group in 1934. In 1939, the Company was producing the first of its Hawker Hurricanes, of which 2,750 were eventually built at the Gloucester plants. The Hurricane had been in service for barely two years, and so it will be appropriate to weigh features that emerged in the E28 against those already proven in the Hurricane, and, as the design proceeded, with Hawker's successor, the Typhoon. This aircraft was also produced in quantity at Gloucester in due course.
The definitive version of the Whittle engine, around which the Specification was to be written, was the W2, intended to produce a sea-level static thrust of 1,200lb . At a high cruising speed, this engine would give a thrust power comparable with that of the Rolls-Royce Merlin II installation of the Hurricane II, which was then going through the factory. However, the weight of the power-plant would be around a third of that of the Merlin and its associated equipment. Thus, a lighter and smaller aircraft could be envisaged, having correspondingly lower drag, with power available that would enable substantially higher performance to be obtained. The improvement would be greatest at higher altitudes, where the thrust of the jet engine was predicted to fall off less with height than that provided by a piston engine.
A series of meetings took place in the autumn of 1939 between Carter and the Air Ministry, including senior personnel from the RAE, with the object of defining the design requirements to the point at which a final Specification and a contract could be formulated. Much of the limited material that has survived about the early interactions between the parties has been summarised by Kershaw (8) . Among other historical detail, this shows how the Company came to be the one invited to submit the first proposals for an airframe to carry the Whittle engine.
It is now apparent that there were three distinct phases in the evolution of the purely jet-propelled aircraft that became the E28. These might be termed the Preliminary, Intermediate and Final designs. Firstly, two possible Preliminary layouts were put up, both with an all-up weight of only 2,800lb and span of 27ft. These have been illustrated by Kershaw from contemporary drawings (8) . One utilised a short fuselage, with the propulsive jet discharging below a boom extending from behind the cockpit canopy to carry the empennage. However, it seems that this arrangement fell from favour because of uncertainties about the effects of the jet efflux and its entrained airstream on the action of the tailplane. (It might be noted here that when RAE later carried out some tests to measure these effects, they employed a model of the 'short jet' Preliminary design for the purpose (9) ). The other Preliminary design had a more conventional layout, with flush intakes low down on either side near the nose, and the jet pipe passing through the length of the fuselage to a Terms used only once are defined where they appear in the text. Having regard to the historical viewpoint and consistency with quotations, contemporary terminology and units are used throughout. Units were mostly based on the pound-foot-second system, though speed was usually given in miles per hour (mph). Speeds read from the air speed indicator were generally qualified by ASI (air speed indicated) or EAS (equivalent air speed -speed at sea level giving the same stagnation pressure rise), sometimes with corrections made for instrument and position errors. TAS (true air speed) indicates a calculated value for the actual speed through the air, after all corrections had been made, including any required for effects of compressibility.
INTRODUCTION
The designation E28/39 shows that it refers to an experimental aeroplane, for which the specification was the 28th to be formulated by the British Air Ministry in 1939. Here, it is referred to as the E28, the everyday term used by those who worked on it at the Gloster Aircraft Company at Hucclecote and other plants in Gloucester. In the official documentation, it was called the Gloster Whittle E28/39, indicating that its main purpose was to validate in flight the capability of the turbo-jet engine, developed by the company Power Jets Ltd, that had been founded by Frank Whittle in 1936. Considering the dire threat to the country in 1939/40, it is understandable that the Air Ministry should have considered at first that, though essentially experimental, it should be designed as if it might go into production as a fighter. Some military equipment, including four Browning machine guns, was suggested. Contemporary sources do not support the assertion that the proposed fitting of guns was itself of an experimental nature, intended to test the effect of their firing on flow at the nose intake (1) . A potential military role for the aircraft was however moved into the background later, when it was realised that the requirements for the equipment would unduly compromise its performance as a research machine. A handcorrected copy in the National Archives shows the amendments made to the original draft specification (2) retaining only that 'the design shall be based on requirements for a fixed gun interceptor fighter as far as the limitations of size and weight imposed by the power unit permit'.
That a possible military function was considered is a reminder of the exigencies of the times. These are reflected starkly in a contemporary memorandum by Hayne Constant of the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) (3) . Concerning the potential contribution to the war effort of the earliest jet-propelled machines, he acknowledges that the engines available for these would probably provide 'insufficient power to lift a military load'. But he goes on 'It will therefore be necessary, if these machines are to be considered as fighting machines, to design them on the assumption that ramming tactics will be used'.
It was into this grim climate that the little E28, shown in Fig. 1 , emerged. John Grierson, writing about it from personal experience as one of its test pilots (4) , referred to it as the Pioneer. Those who designed, built and flew it were indeed making pioneering advances into new aviation technology. But, unknown to them at the time, the first flight with a turbo-jet engine had already been made recently in Germany, by the Heinkel 178. Though Whittle's engine had been the first to run on test, an engine designed by Hans-Joachim Pabst von Ohain, who was aware of Whittle's pre-war patents, had been first into the air. The early history of the gas-turbine engine in this context has been extensively reviewed, beginning with Whittle's own account (5) . Concerning the E28, Whittle commented at one point that 'Once a jet engine existed, no great act of invention was required for an aeroplane to use it' (6) . No doubt the many obstacles that he had to overcome in his own part of the project would have coloured his view (7) . Yet it cannot obscure the historic contribution made by the designers of the E28, headed by (Wilfred) George Carter and the team, led by his chief assistant Richard Walter Walker. They had to bring to reality what Constant had expected to be 'a type of machine radical in many design features and subjected to flying conditions outside the range of our existing experience' (3) . nozzle at the rear end. This is shown in side elevation in Fig. 2 , together with those of the Intermediate and Final designs, forming what is considered here to be the main sequence through which the E28 evolved. Table 1 lists the more notable aerodynamic changes that were made between the three stages.
It is perhaps not fanciful to sense some excitement on the part of the Gloster team in the initial estimates of the performance for the early designs, already described in a Company brochure as 'quite exceptional' (10) . The tables and hand-drawn curves accompanying this showed for the first time the pattern of the new era. In contrast with the familiar rise and fall in performance of piston-engined aircraft with altitude, then being regulated by supercharging, the maximum level speed is shown rising from 415mph at sea level to 460mph at around 40,000ft, with a ceiling of 50,000ft. No contemporary aircraft could approach this performance. The improvement with altitude was based on Whittle's calculations that atmospheric properties and ram compression in the intake would result in the thrust decreasing with altitude at a somewhat lower rate than the drag of the airframe. Further, the accompanying fall of fuel consumption with altitude is shown to compare very favourably with that of a piston-engined aircraft. Even at this early stage, it is pointed out that a very thin wing would be required 'to reduce the possibility of a pressure wave at high speeds'. With the potential military application still in mind, Carter wrote in an attached section that the design could be 'immediately adapted in the event of satisfactory flight tests. The conception of this possibility is more than justified by the great simplicity of both engine and airframe, both of which are capable of being manufactured in very large quantity in very short periods of time' (10) . Estimates of performance made by the RAE staff had broadly agreed with the Gloster assessment (11) . The revised Specification, dated 21 January 1940, was issued, though by then the Company had already progressed far with a design along the same lines.
It is quite open-ended, the speed and other performance measures being required to be 'as high as possible, and not less than' the specified values, including a minimum level speed of 380mph. This was faster than that of the front-line Hurricane and Spitfire fighters of the day, and was certainly sufficient to meet the principal requirement, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Whittle engine in flight. The specified rate of climb at sea level, at 'not less than 4,000ft/min', was far ahead of current capability, and would not be equalled until the arrival of aircraft fitted with a new generation of piston engines, with more than 2,000 horsepower available to the designers.
Two aircraft of the Final design were subsequently built and flown. These were officially designated as prototypes, and later carried the appropriate yellow 'P' insignia. Though their performance exceeded the requirements, it had become apparent that an aircraft with a significant military capability would not be possible with a single engine of the Whittle type. The range and performance needed in an air-defence role would require a greater payload and fuel capacity than had been possible with just one engine at that stage of development. As early as the spring of 1940, Carter schemed a larger aircraft with a Griffon piston engine in the nose and a Whittle engine behind. This was called simply the Gloster Boosted Fighter (12) . However, in the rush of ideas, that of a mixed power-plant machine was soon left behind, and that scheme is not considered here to be part of the evolution of the E28. The next Gloster machine was to be the twin-jet Meteor, for which the specification F9/40 was issued even before the E28 had flown.
The consideration that follows here relates mostly to the Final design of the aircraft, reviewed against the backdrop of its time. The era of the all-metal, piston-engined monoplane fighter, which was itself to last for little more than a decade, had begun not long before. The Hurricane had first flown with a metal-skinned wing only in April 1939 (13) . Surviving Gloster drawings and photographs show that the construction of the E28 essentially prefigured that of the generations of jet fighters that would follow (8) . The fuselage was an all-metal monocoque, with a stringer-stabilised stressed skin, flush-riveted over frames and longerons. The wings and tail were similarly constructed, over spars BRINKWORTH ON THE AERODYNAMICS OF THE GLOSTER E28/39 309 
Preliminary to Intermediate
Intermediate to Final fuselage length increased fuselage length increased intake moved from flush to pitot intake enlarged, nose shortened cockpit moved aft cockpit enlarged canopy enlarged sliding hood fitted wing lowered fin moved forward wing moved aft fin shape changed wing dihedral increased rudder fraction increased tailplane raised slightly rudder horn-balanced tailplane raised slightly empennage/fuselage fairing fitted Table 1 Changes affecting aerodynamics in evolution of E28/39 so, compressibility effects are mentioned in the Specification, probably for the first time in such a document. Though no specific actions were laid down, 'Additional cases to cover flights approaching the local speed of sound are to be agreed with the Airworthiness Department'. It becomes clear that both Whittle and Carter were well aware of the background to this, attention to compressibility being apparent in several areas of the design from the beginning.
It is of interest to consider the origins of this awareness. One likely source was a paper on the consequences of compressibility for highspeed flight, by Christopher Lock of the National Physical Laboratory (NPL), published in the Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society of March 1938 (14) . Both Carter and Walker were Associate Fellows of the Society, and would have received the Journal as a consequence of their membership. Lock's review showed that accounting for the effects of compressibility at high subsonic speeds had only recently begun to acquire a theoretical basis. The lengthy build-up to this point has been set out by Ackroyd (15) . It was known that, as forward speed increased, the lift coefficient of an aerofoil at first rose, and then fell rapidly after reaching a peak. By analogy with the effects following the peak of lift at increasing incidence (angle-of-attack), this was called the 'shock stall'. It followed the appearance of shock waves in the flow, initially on the suction surface. An abrupt pressure rise through the shock caused a redistribution of forces, with large changes in the lift and moment coefficients. Measurements in the new high speed tunnel at NPL showed that the drag continued to rise steeply, up to the limit of the tunnel's speed. Irreversibility of energy conversion across the shock fronts gave rise to the new phenomenon of wave drag. Profile drag was also raised, by lack of pressure recovery over the rear of the section, and by thickening of the wake, due to disturbance of the boundary layer caused by the localised pressure rise across the foot of the shock. However, observations with projectiles had shown that, with further increase in speed, the drag coefficient passed through a maximum, before falling again in the supersonic regime.
Lock's view was that the key to flight into the high subsonic region was to be sought in finding appropriate external shapes for lifting surfaces and fuselage envelopes by which the onset of compressibility effects would be delayed, and their consequences perhaps reduced. In an appendix to his paper, he gave in full an analysis by his colleague Ernest Relf, by which could be determined the forward speed at which the maximum speed of the air accelerating over a surface reached the local sonic velocity. This was supposed, reasonably enough at the time, to give the forward speed at which a shock would first appear, and the stall was expected to ensue shortly. The corresponding forward speed would define the critical Mach number for the body concerned.
Lock's paper gave examples of the results of Relf's procedure for bodies of various two-and three-dimensional shapes, as reproduced in Fig. 3 (14) . An overarching requirement was to keep the thickness ratio of wings and bodies as low as possible. Examples showed that shapes having well-rounded forward surfaces were to be preferred, with profiles of generally elliptical form. But to limit the acceleration of the air, it was considered necessary to locate the position of maximum thickness further aft than had been customary hitherto, both for aerofoils and streamlined bodies. It was shown also that the onset of shock stall would be expected to occur later on bodies of revolution than on aerofoils with the same profile. (The given example of a body shape, shown in Fig. 3 , did not quite conform with the advice, having a nose in the form of a prolate spheroid, and maximum diameter at about 30% of the length, but was still expected to be suitable for speeds up to 600mph).
It is not recorded whether Carter or Walker were present at the lecture in 1937 that gave rise to Lock's paper, but Frank Whittle certainly was. Prefacing his (otherwise somewhat opaque) contribution to the discussion, he made a forthright assertion of his opinion about achieving high speed flight (14) . He is reported as having 'desired to register a protest against the point of view they had heard that evening, and had heard previously, that speeds approaching the speed of sound were hopelessly impracticable. It would be most unfortunate and girder ribs, though the control surfaces were still fabric-covered for lightness, as for other contemporary aircraft. A tricycle undercarriage with nosewheel, then a novelty, was adopted. Little more need be said here about the structure itself, as the emphasis will be on the aerodynamic aspects of the design, but the result was a pleasing, forwardlooking form, well suited to the pivotal role it was to occupy.
Two airframes were built, designated W4041 and W4046. They were subject to great secrecy, the suffix /G added to their registration numbers indicating that they were to be guarded at all times when on the ground. One airframe, W4041, has survived, and can be seen suspended from a ceiling on permanent display in the National Museum of Science and Industry in South Kensington. It is striking to contemplate the capability of this little aeroplane, with the final span of 29ft, no larger than a sports microlight aircraft of today. Though conceived in 1939, and fitted with the very first flyable jet engines, it had climbed at an initial rate of over 5,000ft/min, reached an altitude of nearly 43,000ft with some in hand, been flown at around 500mph in level flight, and to a Mach number of 0⋅82 in a dive.
Some of the aerodynamic factors that had enabled the E28 to have this notable performance are now reviewed.
THE CHALLENGE
With maximum level speeds still generally below 350mph, it had not hitherto been necessary for designers to take much account of the compressibility of the air for normal flight conditions. With the nextgeneration piston-engined fighters of 1941/2, effects attributable to compressibility would become troublesome when aircraft were dived steeply under power. But limitations had been experienced first with propellers, at a much earlier time, where rising power loss and reduction of thrust became noticeable as the relative speed at the tips of the blades approached that of the speed of sound. Whittle's invention now offered a means of producing thrust without using propellers, and so without those limitations.
With the arrival of jet propulsion, there came a step change in aeronautics. Speed would now continue to increase with altitude, until the ceiling was approaching. It would start to fall only where the rise in the required lift coefficient at low air density caused the vortex drag component to become significant. Contemporary fighters reached maximum speed at the altitude at which the engine's supercharging reached its limit, where they would barely attain half the local speed of sound. But at the low air temperatures around the tropopause, where the speed of sound fell to about 660mph, the E28 was expected from the beginning to approach its critical Mach number in level flight. And The shape chosen for the fuselage can be recovered by scaling from the surviving Gloster drawings (8) . It was certainly the simplest possible -the basic profile resembles that of an axisymmetric streamlined body, truncated at the nose, to form the pitot-type air intake, and at the tail for the nozzle of the propulsive jet. RAE's suggestion had been to base the nose shape on the RAF 30 aerofoil section, though with a maximum depth at about 40% of the overall length, in accordance with Lock's prescription (18) . However, the shape actually chosen has an elliptical profile back to the maximum diameter point. The shape of the rear fuselage had been left open. Although no record has emerged to give the origin of this, it is conjectured here that Carter chose a profile based on that of the special high-speed aerofoil section devised for the wing of the E28, which will be considered more fully in Section 5. This carried the prefix EC, indicating that the forepart is elliptical and the rear is represented by a cubic equation. It is convenient in showing this, to take general coordinates, such that, at a fraction X of the length, measured from the front, the depth of the section is expressed as a fraction Y of the maximum depth, occurring at X = 0⋅4. For the uncambered form, the shape of the region forward of the maximum depth is then given by the ellipse
. . (1) and, aft of this point, the shape is defined by the cubic polynomial
In Fig. 4 , the fuselage profile, scaled from the Gloster drawings, is compared with the shape given by Equations (1) and (2), for a 17% diameter/length ratio. It is seen that the fuselage profile is virtually identical with this, agreement extending rearwards over about 80% of its length. There is a departure towards the tail, where an enlarged diameter would have been necessary to accommodate the internal duct for the jet. Since Lock and others from the NPL are known to have been in close contact with the Gloster team during the early stages of the design (8) , it thus seems very probable that the profile of the EC section chosen for the wing was also the model for the E28 fuselage shape.
The next stage of development in this area was not to be reported for another five years, when Young and Young were able to give a further recommendation for a body shape for 'conditions such that shock waves and their attendant effects are delayed to as high a Mach number as possible' (23) . For the same fineness ratio, this shape too is barely distinguishable from that chosen earlier for the E28 (except for the enlargement to accommodate the jet nozzle at the rear).
if anybody went away with the impression that such speeds were out of the question'. The rapport between Carter and Whittle has often been commented upon, and an echo of this viewpoint is found in the chapter that Carter later contributed to Grierson's book (4) . He asserted that 'the time is not far off when speeds near to sonic velocity will be accomplished. The next step will be to pass through the sonic gateway and to emerge into a realm where flight exceeds the speed of sound'. It seems unfortunate that the media did not pick up the term 'sonic gateway', as enthusiastically as they had the 'sound barrier' that was later to seize the popular imagination. Carter went on to describe the form of a 'small research aeroplane' to accomplish this. 'It would need to have very thin wings, a body just large enough to accommodate engine, fuel and pilot and nowhere to stow the undercarriage'. He might have added that he had already gone a long way towards realising this in his design for the E28.
Carter's interpretation of the situation in 1939 was not for some time overtaken by subsequent events. In a key paper of February 1942 (16) , Alec Young of RAE thoroughly reviewed the state of knowledge of compressibility effects at that time, citing 27 references. It was clear by then that the rising generation of piston-engined aircraft would experience these effects in steep dives, and perhaps also in tight combat manoeuvres at maximum power. More wind-tunnel data were becoming available, including some confirming that the critical Mach number for a body of revolution was higher than that of an aerofoil of similar thickness ratio. The need to keep peak suctions to a minimum everywhere on the airframe was emphasised. But essentially, the advice offered to designers was little different from Lock's, already embodied in Carter's design. Even in 1948, when developments were reviewed at the post-war RAeS aeronautical conference (17) , W.G.A. Perring, then Director RAE, would still say that 'theory only provides a crude approximation to the actual conditions found by experiment', and Lock would suggest that even this might be giving 'a more favourable impression of the state of knowledge of compressible flow than was really warranted'.
The earliest available records giving details of how the design process for the E28 went forward show that the essential aerodynamic features had been determined by the autumn of 1939, guided by discussions between Gloster and RAE staff (18) . Some pencilled notes, made by Walker in November and December, show that the period over which these were to be conceived and implemented would be very short (19) . The first formal meeting of the whole design team was held on 10 January 1940, and in calling the next meeting for 14 February, Carter states that they would be held weekly thereafter. They appear to have continued only until May, though the record is probably not complete. The group of papers remaining from these meetings are referenced together (20) . Some later notes by Walker have also survived (21) . Though these and other papers help to give immediacy to the review, records of the many design decisions needed to define a flyable aircraft have not been found, and some of these have had to be reconstructed from the context.
THE FUSELAGE
As noted by Carter, in designing a small aircraft to accommodate the Whittle engine, the first constraint to be considered would be its large overall diameter. Relative to later technology, this was the consequence of its having used a centrifugal compressor, though on the W1 version the outermost components were actually flanges on the combustion chambers. Carter suggested to Whittle how these could be rearranged so as to reduce the diameter by four inches (22) . Whether or not this would have been practicable, it was not done, and the smallest value of the fuselage outer diameter at that point had to be about 48 inches. Contemporary photographs given by Kershaw show that it forms a very close fit to the engine (8) . The maximum diameter, somewhat further forward, is nearly a foot wider than the maximum width of the fuselage of the Hurricane, though that was a much larger aircraft with a span of 40ft. . E28 fuselage profile (square dots) ompared with uncambered EC1240 section (full line), matched at points of maximum diameter (fuselage scaled from Kershaw (8) ).
The delivery of the intake air into a plenum chamber ahead of, and surrounding, the engine compressor casing meant that two bulkheads and part of the airframe structure were subjected to an internal pressure difference. It was agreed (11) that this should be based on the full stagnation pressure at sea level maximum speed (410mph), about 3lb/in 2 . Later, a design value of 5lb/in 2 was adopted, with a reserve factor of 2 (25) . This perhaps represents the first time that a substantial part of the primary structure of an aircraft had to support a pressure difference of this magnitude.
There was a question about how the internal and external air flows would divide naturally at the nose, and whether the latter would smoothly follow the contours of the body. Little relevant material can be found on this in contemporary literature, for example on aircooled radiators, and it would be some years before detailed study of the flow in and around pitot intakes would be undertaken. The shape of the intake lip was discussed during a visit by Gloster staff to Power Jets in March 1940 (27) . It was recognised that no shape could meet the requirements for operation when the aircraft was stationary as well as in flight, without flow separations occurring in some conditions. Whittle thought that the bias of the design should be towards the requirements in flight, and suggested that the shape of the lip should resemble that of the leading edge of an aerofoil 'of the type suitable for high speed conditions'. The question of the lip shape was to emerge again later.
At the rear, there was an expectation that the emerging jet efflux would have some entrainment effect on the external flow over adjacent structure and the tail surfaces, but this could not be quantified at the time, as almost nothing was known about the emergence of a supersonic jet into free air. As part of the specification, the company was required to provide a 'complete model of the aircraft for wind-tunnel testing, in which the intake duct would be represented', so as to enable the effects of these flows to be investigated empirically. At an early meeting, it was suggested that 'the possibilities of assimulating (sic) the jet conditions on the model were to be examined by the RAE' (11) . A table concerning the Preliminary design showed that drag figures for components of the airframe other than the wings were related to the wetted area of the component, together with a mean skin-friction coefficient C F , referred to the Reynolds number (10) . This method was in general use at the relevant time (27) , and indeed continues in use today, for initial estimates for components on which skin friction is the predominant source of drag (28) . It has been usual to derive the coefficient from Prandtl's well-known expression for a flat plate with a turbulent boundary layer, in zero pressure gradient :
Where Re L is the Reynolds number referred to the surface length L in the flow direction. The surface area of the E28's fuselage is about 213ft 2 , (45% greater than the gross plan area of the wing), so that, by
Whatever the origin of the profile, it was evidently a felicitous choice. The view of W4041 in flight, in Fig. 5 , shows the clean, purposeful shape of the fuselage, representing most of a streamlined axisymmetric body with a ratio of length to maximum diameter of around six. The somewhat 'tubby' appearance seen in most side views is probably accentuated by the truncation of the length at the nose and tail, the large relative scale of the canopy placed on top of so small an airframe, and, when on the ground, interruption of the nose profile by the lowered nosewheel doors. In discussions with RAE personnel in September 1939, the possibility of 'retracting the pilots head dome' had been considered (24) , though this was not done. Even in plan view, the fuselage still seems tubby, perhaps due to its size relative to the wings. The maximum width of the fuselage is around one-sixth of the span, twice the proportion for the Hurricane, for example.
There was discussion on the effects of the flow required by the engine on the internal duct flow and external airflow. The nose intake and the ducting up to the engine bay were initially designed around the air mass flow-rate of 26lb/sec at sea level, then predicted for the W2 engine at maximum rpm (24) . Whittle had assumed in performance calculations that the energy loss in the ducts would be 10% of the energy at inlet, a substantial penalty. Carter had accepted his advice that the mean velocity in the outlet of the duct, at the engine plenum chamber end, should not exceed 100ft/sec (though RAE representatives thought that the loss would not be 10% even if a mean velocity of 200ft/sec were used, as had been initially proposed by Gloster). At the nose, the diameter of the intake in the Intermediate design had been 18in, with an area of 1⋅76ft 2 .
In the Final version, the diameter is 21in (area 2⋅4ft 2 ), corresponding to a nominal mean inlet velocity of around 150ft/sec at the design point. This would have allowed also for the additional flow expected to be required to provide cooling air for the rear turbine bearing of the W1A and W2 engines, which would be used after the first few flights Two ducts convey the air from the nose intake to the engine plenum chamber. Bifurcating the flow immediately after the intake, these are straight in elevation, passing along the sides of the fuselage, around the nose-wheel bay and the cockpit, to form two smooth curved tubes (8) . Each has a non-circular and varying crosssection, with three full-length streamwise dividers. It would not have been a simple matter to calculate the flow losses in these, but no records of test measurements have been found. Significant further losses would have been caused by the radiators, that were initially fitted at the engine bay ends of the ducts. These had been provided for cooling the W1 engine intended to be used for the taxying and initial flight trials, which, being based on the test-bed models, had a water-cooled turbine bearing. Fortunately, air-cooling became available for the W1A version, fitted after early trials with W4041, and for the W2 engines for the main series of tests with both aircraft, so the radiators were not then required. Carter resisted suggestions that a 20% smaller wing should be used, though this was said by RAE to offer a further 20 -50mph on the maximum speed (11, 34) . A factor here might have been that he was concerned to obtain a reasonable take-off run, particularly with the reduced thrust of the initial flight engine. The option of having a spare wing set, described as 'clipped', was also not accepted, on the ground of also requiring a spare tail set to match. The fitting of leading-edge slots was discussed at one point, but these were not proceeded with (20) . There is no indication in the surviving literature that any washout was employed, and none can be discerned in the available photographs.
In many respects, the wings conform to the evolving patterns for the time. Aft of the rear spar (at about 74% chord) are the hinge lines of ailerons outboard and split flaps inboard. The flaps terminate just beyond a root fillet, which blends the wing into the fuselage. This is of the usual type, with the trailing edge curving upwards to join the rear of what appears to be a symmetrical section projected onto the fuselage side, and placed parallel to the fuselage axis. The proportions are similar to those on the Hurricane (though the fairing is less prominent than on the Spitfire, for example).
It was decided at an early stage that two sets of wings would be made for the first airframe, W4041, both with the same planform. They were sometimes referred to as the 'high lift' and the 'high speed' wings. The high lift set, to be used for the first few flights, would have a conventional aerofoil section, probably partly to keep advances to a minimum at that critical stage. The first engine available for flight, W1, would be giving barely two-thirds of the static thrust of the W2, around which the design was based. A familiar section, with high maximum lift coefficient, would give greater margins for ensuring a satisfactory take-off and landing. For most of the flight trials, both aircraft were fitted with the 'high speed' wings, having a section initially referred to by Gloster as 'symmetrical', though actually with a small camber. The shape for this was specified in consultation with RAE and NPL, and was to have a significant place in the early stages of high subsonic aviation. Some dimensions of the two types of wing were slightly different, leading to minor contradictions in descriptions published subsequently (1, 8, 12, (35) (36) (37) . In the definitive Gloster document of 1943, the 'Prototype Notes' (38) , the dihedral at the chord line is shown to have been 4°12' for the 'high lift' wing, but for some unrecorded reason, the value was just 4°for the 'high speed' one. Both are higher than the 3 -3⋅5° of Hurricanes. The rigging incidence of the wing is given as 1° to the fuselage axis, though it will be seen later that the values for the two wings were slightly different.
Carter's initial choice of a 14% t/c ratio at the root was reduced to 12%, with a deliberate view to lessening compressibility effects (11, 34) . However, with such a small wing this could be done only at the expense of not being able to enclose the main wheels fully when retracted. The two resulting under-wing bulges, at the location of the main wheel doors, are readily noticed on W4041 in the head-on view of Fig. 7 , but do not detract much from its fine lines. Smaller bumps this method, its contribution to the overall C D would be about 0⋅003.
The limited values given in the Gloster table are larger than this, by some 60% for the fuselage. A contemporary RAE report (29) gives a rule-of-thumb for calculating the profile drag to be added, but this would amount to a further 7% only. It is likely that the Gloster estimates include empirical factors, to allow for profile drag and for minor unaccountable effects. Corrections of this kind are mentioned in a general way in the respected contemporary textbook by Piercy (30) , and in another, Warner (31) recommends increasing the skinfriction drag estimate by a total of 100%. A paper by Relf shows that the determination of surface drag was still an active area of enquiry at the time (32) . One factor that was already known is the small size of imperfections which will take a given surface into the 'hydrodynamically rough' regime at high Reynolds number. Photographs of W4041, such as Fig. 6 , in the 'bare metal' finish at roll-out for its taxying trials (8) , show workmanship of a high quality, suggesting exceptional fidelity of shape. Combined with this, the use of flush riveting led to a very smooth base to underly the paint finishes added later. Surface roughness should not then have been a significant factor in this case.
The table in the early brochure gives a drag figure for the 'cabin' also, which on the same basis would add an increment of about 0⋅0008 to the C D . No indication is given of the method used to obtain this.
The weight of the power plant for contemporary single-engined fighters meant that there was only a short length of fuselage forward of the wing. With the engine now well aft, around the point of maximum fuselage diameter, the E28 had the relatively longer nose that was to be characteristic of many of the single-jet fighters that would follow it. The larger lateral area forward of the cg would require estimation of a number of other factors, affecting stability and control, that were somewhat unexplored at the time. These are considered in Sections 7 and 9 below.
THE WINGS
For the final design, Carter had specified low-set wings, with an aspect ratio of 5⋅75, a taper ratio of 3:1 and rounded tips. This shape was already known at that time to give a tip vortex drag close to the minimum value of the ideal classical form with elliptical spanwise lift distribution. It is quite a sharp taper, compared, for example, with about 2:1 on the Hurricane. The main spars were set at 30% chord and were without sweepback. They enter the fuselage at the point of its maximum diameter. Whilst the structure is not considered in any detail here, it is noted that the difficulties of the times, evidenced by a report at a design meeting in January 1940, meant that 'insufficient spar material exists for a test wing' (20) . It appears that the extensive flying programme discussed below had to be undertaken without any assurance from a wing strength test.
The ratio of span to overall length for the E28 was 1⋅15. The somewhat smaller value than those for the Hurricane (1⋅25) and Typhoon (1⋅29) is partly accounted for by the absence of a spinner. There was clearly some difficulty at first in deciding how to evaluate the characteristics of wings, when they are attached to a fuselage whose width is a significant fraction of the span. The gross plan area of 146⋅5ft 2 includes the notional projection within the fuselage, and the nett outside area of 117ft 2 is 20% smaller. While modern aerodynamic practice is to work with the gross area, Carter seems to have had misgivings about doing so, no doubt due to a justifiable uncertainty about the continuity of lift across such a wide fuselage area. It is clear, for instance, that in a table of data for the Preliminary design (10) , the values given for the mean chord and associated aspect ratio were at that time derived from the dimensions of the nett wing. This was also used in determining the design wing loading of 28lb/ft 2 (a little less than that of the Hurricane II). In later work, the gross wing area was used, the change probably following the practice at the RAE.
BRINKWORTH
ON THE AERODYNAMICS OF THE GLOSTER E28/39 313 could be reached locally before the first shock wave appeared. As indicated in Section 4, profiles found to be promising in this respect were called 'elliptic-cubic'. The section put forward for the E28 was designated EC1240/0640 at the root, the code implying a maximum thickness of 12% at 40% chord, with a maximum camber of 0⋅6% (actually 0⋅58%), also at 40% chord. The equation for the camber line, expressing the camber as a fraction y c of the chord versus the length coordinate X of Equations (1) and (2), is given by (40) ;
The same geometrical shape was used throughout the span, tapering to 9% maximum thickness at the tip. In some documentation, this section is called GW2, seemingly for 'Gloster Whittle 2'. A comparison of the 12% sections for the two types of wing -the high lift and the high speed -is shown in Fig. 8 .
The earliest wind-tunnel testing undertaken for the EC1240 and EC1240/0640 sections is summarised in R&M 2246, dated September 1940 (40) . This reports trials in the 1ft diameter High Speed Tunnel at the NPL, an induced-flow type that enabled high subsonic speeds to be obtained there for the first time. Test specimens having chords of only 2 inches or so could be accommodated, so the Reynolds number would be low. Measurements could be made over a range of speeds, up to M = 0⋅8. With this work, an era was opened in which designers could be furnished routinely with aerodynamic characteristics that fully reflected the early stages of compressibility effects. The NPL tests gave values for the basic quantities required for design -the lift, drag and moment coefficients for the sections, for both positive and negative incidence. Overall, they show that the EC1240/0640 section was generally well-behaved. With its low camber, the zero-lift incidence is small (about -0⋅5°), and the zerolift moment coefficient about -0⋅015. Having been obtained with a constant-chord model fully spanning the tunnel, the results are given as for 'infinite aspect ratio', and bring out the dependence of the profile drag on lift without including tip vortex effects. This is essentially parabolic, both at low speed and after the increase had begun at M = 0⋅75, the highest test Mach number reported for this section.
Though the aerodynamic data for the NACA 230 section were widely available when critical decisions on the aerodynamics had been taken, it is less certain what values for the EC section had been known to the design team. No data had been published at that time, but in view of the close contact between NPL and Gloster, it is probable that they had been provided with those from the NPL High Speed Tunnel, cited above (40) . Further results, for a finite wing of AR = 6, were obtained subsequently in the NPL Compressed Air Tunnel (41, 42) , where a more representative Re could be obtained, though at lower Mach number. They now show C Lmax rising from about 0⋅8, to become stabilised at about 1⋅3 for Re above about 3 million. In the later tests, with the wing fitted with a 15% split flap, the value of C Lmax for the full 75° deflection also increased considerably over this Re range, from 1⋅5 to 2⋅0. When the high speed tunnel results are adjusted for aspect ratio, the two sets are in fair agreement, but are not identical. A similar value of the zero-lift moment to that of the NACA section, of about -0⋅01, is indicated from the combined results. But the relations between C M and C L are distinctly curved. From the gradient at small values of C L , it is indicated that the aerodynamic centre for this section was further forward than for the NACA section, at about 0⋅23c.
In the early Gloster brochure, a value of C Do of 0⋅008 had been assumed for the wing, in conditions below the compressibility rise, and from the available sources this would be reasonable for both the NACA and EC (GW2) wings. An addition of 5% of the overall drag estimate was made, to allow for 'interference', presumably at the wing/fuselage and fin/tailplane/fuselage junctions. Prior to the availability of test results, the preliminary wing profile drag calculations for higher speeds were already being described by Gloster as 'allowing for compressibility'. Some hand-drawn curves of November 1939 (10) show that this allowance had been made by using on the upper surfaces, in the same location, are not so prominent, but were to figure in the later analysis of the flight performance. It was, however, agreed that a 'local bump was better than a thicker wing section', and using Lock's method, compressibility troubles were not expected at speeds up to 500mph. For the high-lift wing, Gloster chose the section NACA 23012 (12% t/c) at the root, tapering to 23009 (9%) at the tip. In a pencilled note about a meeting at RAE on 22 May 1940, Walker gives the t/c ratios more precisely as 11⋅76% at the root and 8⋅68% at the tip (21) This wing was sometimes referred to as the 'N' wing, probably a reference to its NACA section.
The coding rules for the NACA 5-digit series of aerofoils show from the second two digits that the maximum camber of the 230 sections occurs well forward, at 15% of the chord. Characteristics for this section had been widely reported in the literature by the late 1930s, and it was regarded as a good all-round choice (31) . Although it has a rather sharp onset of the stall, the maximum lift coefficient is the highest in the 5-digit series, which probably featured in its selection for the E28. The source of aerodynamic data for this section most likely to have been drawn upon by the Gloster team would be R&M 1898, published in January 1937 (39) . This reports work carried out in the Compressed Air Tunnel at the NPL, in which results were obtained with a finite wing with AR = 6, up to a Reynolds number of 7 × 10 6 . These showed that the section characteristics vary considerably with Re, but become stabilised towards the top end of that range, about where the E28 would be operating. At this point, the zero-lift incidence is -1⋅0°, and C Lmax 1⋅49 (with a 15% split flap, this is 2⋅26 at the full 90° deflection). The moment coefficient for this section is low, the results at the highest Re giving C M0 = 0⋅0098, with the aerodynamic centre at 0⋅248c, almost at the quarter-chord point. A minimum profile drag coefficient C Do of about 0⋅0075 could be expected.
The 'high speed' section recommended to Carter by RAE was mainly the result of work in the aerodynamics department of the NPL at Teddington. The study of new aerofoil shapes, along the lines mentioned by Lock, was led by Herbert Piercy. This was aimed at delaying the onset of compressibility effects on the wing at high subsonic speeds. By a rearward displacement of the point of maximum thickness, relative to earlier practice, the acceleration of the air over the leading parts of the surface was made more gradual. Contrary to initial expectations, it was now being found that, with suitable profiling, velocities significantly greater than sonic velocity
THE EMPENNAGE
A conventional tailplane and single fin were used on the E28 as built, though there are fragmentary notes indicating that a parallel arrangement with twin fins continued to be worked on, to a late stage in the design. Carter had some experience with that arrangement, latterly in the layout for his twin-engined fighter to Specification F9/37. Though two prototypes had been built, and proved to have a lively performance, this type did not go into production (8, 12) . A twin tail was proposed again for his Gloster Boosted Fighter (12) . In the twin arrangement. the outboard position of the fins would have had the advantage of being removed from the uncertain effects of the wake behind the bulky fuselage, and the lifting characteristics of the tailplane would have been improved somewhat. As seen later, this might have had some benefits for the design, but it seems that simplicity was the paramount requirement, and the single-fin arrangement prevailed.
The proportions of the empennage on the E28 are given differently by different sources. From the Prototype Notes, the presented areas of the tailplane and fin, relative to the gross wing area, were 0⋅209 and 0⋅087 respectively, including the areas of the control surfaces (38) . The comparable values given for the Hurricane were 0⋅130 and 0⋅085 (13) , indicating that the fin proportions were similar, but the E28 tailplane was relatively larger. The latter was partly the result of an increase at a late stage in the design, described later. The fin is mounted well forward on the tailplane, resembling quite closely that of Henry Folland's design for the Gloster F5/34 (12) . Two government-funded prototypes of this aircraft had been ordered, making their first flights in 1936 and 1938. They would have been well-known to Carter, who returned to Gloster as Chief Designer at the beginning of 1937, and were flying on experimental programmes until 1941. He seemed to have favoured this fin arrangement, as he employed it again in his later design for a single-seat fighter to E1/44 (8, 12) . The forward position of the fin, though reducing its volume coefficient somewhat, was intended to give greater rudder authority in recovery from the spin, by keeping it ahead of the wake of the tailplane when the aircraft was in a descending path at high incidence. Even so, an anti-spin parachute was fitted on the E28, in a compartment behind the rudder position, though it seems that it never had to be deployed. the linearised Prandtl-Glauert multiplier, expressed by R in Equation (5) . The zero-lift drag coefficient at Mach number M had been related to its low-speed value by the expression;
. . . (5) This expression for the ratio R had been obtained a decade earlier (43) , to give compressibility corrections to lift and moment values, but this use in connection with profile drag was in fact inadmissible. (Although the equations from which it is derived are those for compressible flow, the properties of an inviscid fluid are assumed, for which, by d'Alembert's paradox, the drag component of the pressure distribution over the profile is essentially zero). Some of the NPL-measured profile drag results are shown in Fig. 9 , and compared with the predictions of the rule of Equation (5). It is clear that the high-speed characteristics of the EC1240 section would be quite acceptable for the expected performance of the E28, the increase in drag being quite low up to about M = 0⋅75. However, a rapid rise begins to appear thereafter. This was confirmed by flight data, reported later. The same section was chosen for the F9/40 Meteor aircraft that followed, and despite the drag rise, one of these was later flown at more than M = 0⋅8 at sea level, to obtain a world absolute speed record for the time. Figure 9 also shows that the rise in the measured profile drag coefficient for the EC section lies below the prediction obtained with the Prandtl-Glauert rule. It follows, then, that preliminary drag calculations based on Equation (5) would not have led to an exaggeration of the performance predicted for the E28 in level flight. However, the drag rise was certainly underestimated when another graph was prepared, showing what was expected to result if the assumptions were to hold into the conditions of a steep dive from 44,000ft (10) . These speculations are initialled 'JL', and thus are attributable to John (Jack) Lobley, the principal aerodynamicist on Carter's team (8) . They prefigure the diving trials undertaken in 1944, and reported later. It cannot be considered likely that anyone was expecting at this time that the predicted maximum speed, of about 690mph, would actually be experienced. However, one feels that the members of the design team were already highly enthused by the indications that a major advance in performance would be possible with this machine, and were not of a mind to be too questioning at times.
It is noted that in one of the earliest discussions with RAE personnel, it had been suggested that the wings might be swept back (11) . The effect of this in delaying the drag rise was not known then, but nor was it to be on the first German use of sweep, the aim being in both cases to move the aerodynamic centre rearwards, to assist with obtaining a satisfactory balance position. Carter rejected sweep on the grounds of structural complications. No doubt a very modest change was in mind, but it remains to be conjectured whether the E28 might have penetrated yet further into new aeronautical territory if it had been given swept-back wings.
When staff of RAE and NPL viewed one of the airframes at Gloster in January 1941, they reported that the wings showed 'workmanship of a high order', with 'wing surfaces remarkably even and free from flats and ridges' (44) . Later, G.P. Douglas of RAE forwarded to Carter estimates of the extent of laminar flow to be expected on the two types of wing (45) . Although a rearward position of the point of maximum thickness was widely believed to delay boundary-layer transition, it was estimated that in fact this would occur at about 20% chord on the upper surface of both sections, and somewhat further aft on the lower surfaces.
It is seen from the above that overall, the aerodynamic characteristics of the two types of wing for the E28 were not widely different. However, as both types showed significant sensitivity to Re effects, there were implications for the applicability of results from the whole-model tests that were carried out later. 
BALANCE, STABILITY AND CONTROL
Although by 1939 work in this area was still largely limited to rigidbody mechanics, the basic expressions for balance, stability and control in the three airframe axes were fully available in contemporary texts, such as that of E.W.C. Wilkins (of the Bristol Aeroplane Company) (33) . These should, in principle, provide a basis for the design of any aircraft of conventional form, with a good prospect of its being stable and controllable in flight. Despite these efforts, it was common for modifications to be required after the early flights of a prototype, initially to ensure safe test flying. Others might be needed for production models, to ensure that control would be adequate for routine flying by average Service pilots, with static and manoeuvre margins appropriate to the role. Where difficulties arose at the design stage, it was not because of the inadequacy of understanding of the processes involved, but through uncertainty about the values of the essential aerodynamic coefficients and derivatives that would prevail for a given airframe in given flight conditions. There were no assured ways of obtaining these for particular cases, and so, to provide an initial check on the airworthiness of an outline design, a group of rules-of-thumb had grown up. It would be usual for any design office to maintain its own in-house preferences for these values, but no documentation on practice at Gloster has been found. Occasionally, some general-purpose figures are given in the contemporary literature, but it is significant that these are invariably followed by advice that wind-tunnel testing is indispensable to back up all estimation (30) . A particular uncertainty to be faced early in the design of the E28 was the absence of the slipstream provided in previous fighter experience by the accelerated flow through the propeller. In the new situation of jet propulsion, it would be especially problematic to estimate reliably the point in the take-off run at which the elevators and rudder would have sufficient authority for adequate control, and the point when this would be lost on landing. An editorial in Aircraft Engineering immediately focused on this aspect, as soon as the existence of jet propulsion was revealed in 1944 (47) . Blackburn reported that, as a result, the area of the elevators of the E28 were 'particularly generous' (35) , and for King they were 'uncommonly large' (36) . But in fact, the Gloster drawings show them to have been about 45% of the total horizontal tail area (8) , which was comparable with about 41% on the Hurricane and about 36% on the Typhoon (12, 13) , so this proportion was not significantly unusual. The rudder proportion was also larger, at about 67% of the vertical tail area, compared with nearly 60% on the Hurricane and about 49% on the Typhoon. Just what should be counted as 'fin' was uncertain at the time of the E28, and there remain several methods for determining it today, which can give significantly different proportions (28) . Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the rudder area proportion was larger than was usual in contemporary practice, accompanied by the small area of 4⋅25ft 2 quoted for the fixed fin (38) . The relative value was perhaps one area where a value was chosen as an insurance against unknown effects of the absence of propeller wash.
On the wings, the total aileron and flap areas, including tabs, relative to the gross wing area, were 0⋅081 and 0⋅072 respectively, compared with 0⋅076 and 0⋅097 for the Hurricane (13) . The flap proportion was then relatively smaller, which can be traced largely to the lack of available space due to a higher fraction of the wing centresection being occupied by the wider fuselage.
All control surfaces were initially fabric-covered, and followed the profile of the primary surfaces. Ailerons and elevators were of the plain type, with rounded noses, moving within a matching shroud. Narrow apertures in the primary surface ahead of the hinge line allowed for movement of mass balances. Stick forces were kept low by the use of aerodynamic balance, provided for the ailerons through the use of geared tabs, of about 10% of the control surface area, and for the elevators by set-back of the hinge line. The rudder was balanced by a horn section, projecting forward over the top of the fixed fin. The resting position of tabs would have to be adjusted on the Details of the section used in the empennage are scanty. A note by Walker indicates that a lifting profile, to the same NACA section as the wing, had been considered for the twin-tailed version (21) . By current practice, a symmetrical section would normally be used, both for the tailplane and the fin, typically of the NACA 00 form. Given Carter's attention to compressibility, it might be expected that the uncambered version of the EC profile would be chosen for the E28. Walker's notes show that the thickness ratio for the tailplane was 12%, and some later wind-tunnel work at RAE, using a tailplane of EC1240 section with a fin of EC1040, perhaps suggests that this was the arrangement used. Carter's preference for a forward displacement of the fin relative to the tailplane had anticipated the general advice that was given later, so that the positions of their peak suctions would not coincide (or alternatively, to fit a bullet fairing where that was not practicable). In a letter from RAE of August 1940, he was now advised that, using Lock's method, compressibility effects would not be expected to be serious on the tail, for elevator angles up to 5°, before a shock-wave had developed on the wing. Accordingly, no unusual effects were expected on pulling out of a dive at up to 500mph (46) . It is likely that this was the first occasion on which a designer had been provided with that kind of estimation.
The setting of the tailplane on the E28 is generally quoted as 1°45′ to the fuselage axis (8) , as this is the value given in the Company's Prototype Notes (38) . However, it is the result of a modification to the setting made after the earlier test flights, to adjust the range of incidence over which the aircraft could be trimmed. The original value was just 1° (see below). Even with this setting, the 'longitudinal dihedral', between the effective incidences of the wing and tailplane, would have been only slightly positive for both wings. This would normally sound a warning about possible problems with longitudinal stability, but perhaps here it gives an indication that other factors, such as forces and moments arising from the fuselage, and the effect of its wake on the downwash angle, were already expected to be important in that regard. A return to this aspect is made in Sections 7 and 9.
Though the tailplane is mounted on top of the rear fuselage, it would be operating in a region where the flow over its inner parts, at least, was reduced by the wake. In current practice, this was reflected in a value given to the 'tailplane efficiency', a multiplier of its lifting area. Contemporary literature was giving empirical values of about 65% for tailplanes mounted in this position (27) , but the actual value would have been very uncertain, in view of the bulk of the fuselage, and the relatively large canopy with its long rearward extension.
Drag estimates for the Preliminary design had been based on the wetted area, with a friction drag coefficient C F of 0⋅0046 for both tailplane and fin (10) . As in the case of the fuselage, this is about 50% higher than would be given by Prandtl's flat-plate equation, at the design Re of 9 × 10 6 . An empirical multiplier of this order was recommended in contemporary textbooks, to reflect the effects of things like control surface gaps and interference at the junction with the fuselage (31, 33) . If this coefficient is applied to the total area of the empennage as built, the contribution to the overall C Do would be about 0⋅0029.
It will be convenient at this point to summarise the contributions of the various components of the airframe, as determined in earlier Sections, using the procedure for calculating drag shown to have been adopted by Gloster in its brochure of 1939 (10) . These are collected in Table 2 . first tentative steps being taken to provide a basis for estimation (51) . An NACA paper on wing-on-body moment values had shown that the effects were not given reliably by the sum of contributions from the body and wing measured separately. Empirical correlations were therefore attempted, using both the NACA results and data collected from existing RAE wind-tunnel test reports. With much variation in the fuselage shapes and relative sizes involved, the scatter in the data is too wide to be conclusive about the effect on C Mo . The correlation with the least scatter is one between the forward shift of the aerodynamic centre produced by adding the fuselage, and the projection of the nose forward of the wing, given in mean chords. Taking the E28 dimensions, a rough value is indicated for this shift of about 0⋅045c.
Inevitably, the RAE report concludes with a recommendation for further systematic study, but this seems not to have begun for a further decade (52) . With little certainty about the values to be adopted, much reliance would have to be placed on the wind-tunnel testing that would soon follow.
WIND-TUNNEL TESTING
Gloster could move on to the provision of models for wind-tunnel testing after general approval of the design had been given at the mock-up conference on 10 April 1940. Although RAE reported that by 7 August tests with the spinning model had cleared the aircraft for full-scale spinning trials (53) , no other record of the spinning tests has yet been found. (The object catalogued by the Science Museum as the 'E28 Spinning Tunnel Model' proved on examination to be one for the later E5/42 machine (12) , though it had been considerably modified -for example, having been fitted at some point with a V-tail -and this item has now been re-designated).
The principal wind-tunnel model was made to a scale of 1 to 4½, with a span of nearly 6ft. Figure 10 shows it in plan view, as illustrated in the RAE report on the tests (53) . With one exception, noted below, this is now the familiar Final design form of the E28 as built. Like the prototype, the model was provided with two sets of wings, with the 'high lift' and 'high speed' aerofoil sections, fitted with all control surfaces and flaps. For brevity, these will be termed the N wing and the EC wing respectively. The model test report gives the leading dimensions of the E28, at full scale. These must have been provided by Gloster, and show the rigging angles to be 1⋅2° and 0⋅8° for the N and the EC wings respectively, where the Prototype Notes (38) give a single angle of 1° for both. With the values given, the effective ground according to flight experience, since no provision was made for varying trim from the cockpit.
Carter reported at an early stage that there had been difficulties in obtaining a layout that positioned the cg suitably to satisfy the requirements for overall balance. He had little room for manoeuvre. The maximum diameter of the fuselage had to be located at about 40% of the length, and to obtain the highest slenderness ratio, the engine would have to be placed there. The initial objective had been to locate the cg within an allowable range between 0⋅24 and 0⋅31 of the aerodynamic mean chord of the wing (20) , and a substantial amount of ballast had to be carried in the nose to achieve this.
Although the initial requirement for carrying armament had been deleted from the final Specification, an alternative provision for the carriage of an equivalent weight in removable ballast was retained. Whittle noted that in November 1939, Carter had spoken of having to provide 300lb of ballast in the nose of the aircraft (48) . This burden would have amounted to around 10% of the all-up weight, but the final values seem to have been much less. References to ballast and cg positions continue throughout the available records. The initial provision was 40lb, apparently in the form of 1 inch alloy plate (20) . When W4041 had been weighed the day before the first taxying trials, on 7 April 1941, the cg was found to be about 3 inches aft of the intended position, requiring an addition of 'about 45lbs' to the ballast already in the nose (49) . For the first flight on 16 May 1941, the cg was at '0⋅284 amc, u/c down and 0⋅297 amc, u/c up' (8) . This places it very close to the main spar, located at 30% chord. For the second aircraft, W4046, the ballast is routinely listed as 67lb in the nose, 40lb forward of Frame 2 and 60lb aft of Frame 2, a total of 167lb (50) . When weighed in February 1943, with the pilot and parachute in place, the cg is again placed close to the main spar, at about 0⋅30c. Finally, the Prototype Notes of 1943 state that 'Up to 135lb of ballast may have to be carried under certain loading conditions. It consists of lead weights attached to the top of frame 2' (38) . To establish the conditions for balance and stability, it would have been necessary to know the downwash experienced at the position of the tailplane, and its rate of change with wing incidence or C L . Sources for these might have included the first edition of N.A.V. Piercy's Aerodynamics of 1937 (30) , which gives a theoretical development that would indicate a value of about 0⋅51 for the downwash gradient dε/dα at the downstream location of the tailplane for the E28. Another possibility would be Diehl's Engineering Aerodynamics of 1936 (27) , which gives a set of curves providing for the effect of the position of the tailplane perpendicular to the plane of the wing as well as within it. The curve for the in-plane condition gives the same result as with Piercy's expression, and for the relevant perpendicular displacement, the value is about 0⋅47. These results were given only for an ideal elliptical spanwise lift distribution, but it is likely that this would be taken to be a fair approximation for the 3:1 taper of the E28 wing.
It was to be expected that the longish nose ahead of the cg position would introduce destabilising forces and moments when the fuselage axis was not aligned with the flight path. These would include the lift generated by the fuselage at incidence and the corresponding sideforce in yaw, and the associated force and moment derivatives. No records have emerged to indicate what values were used by Gloster, and the contemporary literature seems not to contain much data to assist the designer on these matters. An isolated reference in the textbook by Wilkins (33) gives a side-force coefficient derivative for 'round fuselages' of 0⋅005 per degree, with no source being cited. This is referred to the presented area of the fuselage from the relevant viewpoint. If it were assumed that the resultant force acted at the quarter-length point, this would give a contribution to the derivative dC M /dC L of about 0⋅03. If further the effect is considered to be additive, this would suggest that the forward shift of the aerodynamic centre, due to the presence of the fuselage, would be of this fraction of the mean chord. As the fuselage would be nose-down to the flow at zero lift, there would also be a small nose-down contribution to C Mo .
Alternatively (or in addition), the Gloster team might have had access to an RAE report of April 1939, which seems to represent the and jet flows. Some separation was noted around the lip of the intake, but after a small modification was made to the outer shape, the external drag at the nose and internal losses in the intake ducts were found to be negligibly small. This modification involved some thickening and rounding of the lip, but no record has been found of a corresponding modification being made to the design of the aircraft, as built.
The effects of modifying the shape of the wing-fuselage fillet and of introducing one at the fin-tailplane junction were investigated, but showed no significant improvement on the basic design. Tests were made in a smaller (5ft) tunnel, of the effect of fairing-in the step in the cockpit canopy, formed by the frame at the rear of the sliding hood, but this was small, and the step remains a noticeable feature of the aircraft. The values of C Do , the overall drag coefficient for the complete model at zero lift, was about 0⋅018 with both types of wing, agreeing well with the estimate shown in Table 2 .
Other measurements were made to determine the maximum suction occurring around the model, so as to obtain an estimate of the critical speed, after which the onset of shock stall might be expected. Using the method reported by Lock (14) , this was now indicated to be about 460mph.
Measurements of yawing and rolling moments due to yaw gave results that were considered acceptable at the time, though, as will be seen below, greater lateral stability was considered to be desirable later. Moments due to control deflections were measured for all three axes. When reduced to standard dimensionless forms, these show that, on an aircraft of such small size and inertia, the control powers should provide reasonable agility. Once the model had been fitted with the larger tailplane, the results indicated that the aircraft was likely to be satisfactory generally. Some supplementary tests were added subsequently (58) , to see if modifications to the split flap arrangement could reduce the elevator movement required to hold trim at the full 75° flap deflection. Though reduction in the flap span reduced the movement from 5° down (6° in Ref. 54 ) to 2°, this was obtained only at the expense of a significant loss of maximum lift coefficient, and the flap arrangement was not changed on the E28 as built.
THE STABILITY QUESTION
It seems surprising that the design, as represented by the wind-tunnel model submitted by Gloster, had been found at first to be unstable longitudinally. However, in the absence of Company records from this period, any consideration of why this might not have been foreseen is necessarily sketchy and conjectural.
From the earliest days of flight, it was known that longitudinal stability depends on the relative positions of the centre of gravity and the neutral point. It is reported in Section 7 above that, for most of its flights, the horizontal location of the cg on the E28 was placed on, or close to the position of the main spar, at 30% of the mean chord. However, the report of the RAE model tests (54) lists the cg position among the overall dimensions, presumably as supplied initially by the Company, further aft at 0⋅345c. The cg position derived from the tunnel results is reported to be similar, at about 0⋅35c with both wings (this is presumably the calculated location of the overall aerodynamic centre of the model). But even with the enlarged tailplane in place, the neutral point is found to be almost at, or only very little aft of, the same position (this is listed as the 'C.G. position for neutral stability').
Although the cg on the aircraft could be adjusted to some extent by ballasting, this would be limited by the amount of trim change that could be tolerated. Locating the neutral point position reliably at the design stage would have required detailed knowledge of moments and their derivatives. The model tests showed the aerodynamic centre derived for the EC wing to be at 0⋅19c, even further forward than had been indicated by the data available to the designers (40) (41) (42) . But other potentially significant uncertainties would be likely to arise mainly from the contributions of the fuselage -the moments applied by it in pitch and the effect of its wake on the flow at the tailplane.
incidence of the EC wing would be almost a degree lower than for the N wing, This was perhaps to counter the more forward position of the aerodynamic centre of the former, noted above.
A motor-driven fan was installed in the fuselage to produce an internal airflow. With this, the correct flow at the intake could be obtained, but not that of the jet efflux. It is recorded that Whittle proposed that an internal combustion chamber be fitted, to provide a representative jet (55) . This would, he calculated, have to be preceded by a 10in diameter fan, driven at 6,000rpm and requiring 1⋅25 horsepower, for which a hydraulic motor drive was suggested. The combustion chamber would require a fuel flow of 2⋅71 gallon/hour, giving a jet temperature of 480°C. This suggestion illustrates Whittle's attention to detail, but the discharge of hot combustion products into the wind-tunnel flow would have created obvious difficulties. It was not adopted, and it was not until 1944 that exhaust jet streams, using electrical heating, could be provided in RAE tunnels (56) . A substantial series of tests was carried out with this model. Made mostly in the 11½ft × 8½ft tunnel, these would have given Gloster confirmation of all the basic aerodynamic characteristics needed to enable the firm to proceed confidently with the build. They included measurement of lift, drag and pitching moment, with and without air flow to the engine (so far as it could be represented); pitching, rolling and yawing moments and side force in sideslip; effects of flap deflection; and aileron, elevator and rudder power. As the results accumulated, some quite extensive observations were made also of the effects of modifications to the size of the tailplane, the shape of the intake lip, the leading edge of the high-speed wing, the wing-root fillet, a tailplane fillet and the cockpit hood. Pressure measurements were made around the airframe and in the wake, to enable estimates to be made of the forward speed at the expected onset of shock-stall. The thoroughness of these painstaking studies at such a critical point for the country is remarkable, but perhaps reflects the climate of determination created by the bleak outlook at the time.
Tests were made with wings of both the N and the EC sections. At the low speed available in this tunnel, typically around 120ft/sec, there were misgivings about the Reynolds number for the tests, which would be less than a tenth of that at full scale. It was already clear from the NPL measurements that the characteristics of both wing sections were strongly sensitive to this. Concern that the results might be unrepresentative led to the use of a third wing, to provide a benchmark. This had a profile, modified from that of GW2, of approximately RAF 32 section, which was known to give more representative results at moderate Re. A trip wire was placed around the intake lip, to stabilise the position of the boundary layer transition forward on the fuselage, as a further measure to minimise scale effects.
The most striking result of the wind-tunnel trials was the indication that the model, as first provided, was in fact unstable longitudinally. The tailplane was then replaced by one of 25% bigger area (this would move both the neutral point and the aerodynamic centre rearwards, but the margin between them would increase). With this, the stability was found to be just neutral. The original tailplane had a full-size span of 10ft, and the replacement of 12ft. The latter is the value now quoted for the E28 as built, and is already shown on the available Gloster drawings, dated 28 August 1940 (8) . Though the wind-tunnel report is dated December, other sources show that Gloster had been made aware of the results in June and July, as the tests proceeded (57) . However, there remains some inconsistency in reports of the tailplane area finally adopted. Scaling from the Gloster drawing gives the gross area to be 33⋅8ft 2 , the same as for the enlarged tailplane used in the wind-tunnel tests. In the Prototype Notes, a value of 30⋅6ft 2 is given, an increase of only half as much (38) . This perhaps represented the nett area, after subtracting the area occupied by the fin, and that obscured by the junction with the fuselage and its small fillet. A dotted outline showing the extent of the tailplane enlargement is shown in Fig. 10 .
Tests were made with and without the fan-driven internal flow, in the latter case with the openings at the nose and tail closed with suitable streamlined fairings. There would have been relief at the finding that neither stability nor trim was much affected by the intake month earlier, the E28 had become airborne, but Sayer had found it necessary to use a large elevator angle, 20 -25°, to cause the nosewheel to leave the ground. Thereafter, he wrote, 'the nose rises very rapidly and care is necessary not to stall the aeroplane' (4) . However, the control surface proportions and the wind-tunnel tests indicate that the elevators would not have been especially powerful, and it seems more likely that these effects arose from the stance of the aircraft on the ground. It is seen in Fig. 6 that, as built, it stood with the fuselage axis virtually horizontal, and its low-set wing was less than half a mean chord above the surface. This was another new situation, now that there was no longer a need for clearance for a propeller. Then in the ground roll, with little room for full downwash to develop, wing lift would be limited. Without elevator deflection, there would be an upload on the tailplane of the E28 while the nosewheel was in contact. And so a large upward elevator deflection would be needed, first to counter this upload and then to produce a sufficient download to raise the nosewheel. During rotation, a nett moment is required about the main wheel contact points, but once airborne, there has to be an immediate transition towards the normal in-flight balance about the cg position. The absence of the moment due to the weight about this position and shortening of the moment arm for the wing lift would result in a much lower download being required at the tail than was needed during rotation about the main wheels. Further, as ground effect fell away, full downwash would develop at the tail, so that in all, most of the elevator deflection would have to be taken off promptly, as reported by the pilot Before the official first flight, the nosewheel leg had to be lengthened (for other reasons), and no problems with the initial rotation were noted then or subsequently. Later photographs, such as that of Fig. 11 , show that the E28s with the longer nosewheel leg had a distinctly nose-up stance on the ground. Though making no further reference to stability, Sayer reported after the first flight that in the air he continued to find that the elevators were still 'very sensitive indeed and . . will require some adjustment'. This might instead be attributed to the lively response of a small aeroplane, with a low moment of inertia due to the engine mass being located close to the cg position.
The contractors' trials covered test and demonstration flights of both airframes, involving four Gloster test pilots, two from RollsRoyce and at least one from RAE Aero Flight. Grierson found it 'a most pleasant little aeroplane to handle' (4) , and there are no subsequent reports that other pilots experienced difficulty in flying W4041 at any point within the specified performance envelope. It is probable then that some factor such as scale effects at the low Reynolds number of the wind-tunnel tests had been responsible for From the wind-tunnel results, the change in the gradient dC M /dC L between wing-only and wing-on-body tests can be evaluated for three different wings (N, EC and modified EC). The values are quite consistent, indicating a forward shift of the aerodynamic centre due to adding the fuselage averaging about 0⋅085c. This is nearly twice as great as the estimate that could have been obtained using the RAE correlation (51) , probably reflecting the fuselage proportions of the E28, with a plan area nearly 60% of that of the wing, and more than half of it ahead of the cg.
On the other hand, the downwash at the tail was also measured in the tests, giving values of the gradient dε/dα of about 0⋅53 for the body with the N wing and 0⋅41 with the EC wing. The fuselage being more nose-down at zero lift with the N wing probably accounts for the difference, but in any case, these are reasonably consistent with the values found from contemporary literature. They indicate that the presence of the fuselage, even with its large canopy, did not have a major effect on the downwash gradient at the tailplane position.
It should probably not be surprising if the destabilising effect of the fuselage had been underestimated in the initial design. Contemporary single-engined fighters, with a massive engine forward, had very little transverse area ahead of the cg. The moment derivative due to the fuselage would normally be small and negative (nose-down). Now, the Gloster team were opening an era when the shape of aircraft would be significantly different, with the engine placed over, or aft of the wing, near the greatest fuselage cross-section. For balance, the nose would project further ahead of the cg than had been usual, and with it the fuselage would become more destabilising than in the experience of the past.
On the basis of the estimates that they were able to make, Gloster might have felt close to a satisfactory arrangement, but whether or not they had reservations, they would be likely to await the results of the whole-model tests before making any necessary modifications and freezing the design. When the tests showed the stability margins to be zero or slightly negative, they would have concluded that there were some effects that they had not been able to take into account fully. Whether or not the events were exactly as supposed, it is certain that Gloster acted immediately on the suggestion from RAE that the tailplane area be increased to counter this. Though the wind-tunnel results were not communicated in writing until later (57) , the enlargement of the the tailplane was already mentioned by Walker in a note of 22 May 1940, following a visit to RAE by Lobley (21) . When all the results were available, the indications were that, with the larger tailplane, the aircraft would be just neutrally stable with the N wing, and have a static margin of 0⋅02c with the EC wing. Gloster would be likely to agree with the RAE view that 'This degree of stability is probably adequate for an experimental aeroplane, which would be flown only by an experienced pilot' (54) .
FLIGHT TRIALS
Ahead of the first flights, Perring of the RAE wrote to assure the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) that the E28 (coded as the GW1) should be 'quite stable longitudinally in flight under all conditions except when the fuel tank is empty; in this condition the stability is neutral' (59) . He suggested that additional ballast would not be needed if flight times were limited, so that about 20% of fuel remained on landing. For how this turned out in practice, reference can be made to the authoritative account of the earlier flight trials of the E28, composed by Grierson not long after the events (4) , which has been the principal recourse for reviews by Goulding (12) and Kershaw (8) , among others. Only a few pertinent details of these need be repeated here.
The single reference to longitudinal stability of the aircraft in flight was a passing comment in the report by Gloster Chief Test Pilot P.E.G. ('Jerry') Sayer on the first flight of W4041. This comes in his remark that 'the aeroplane feels unstable fore and aft but this may be due to the over-sensitive elevators'. In the taxying trials a evidently a misprint. Messages from the RTO at Gloster show that 1°had been proposed, though the increase finally decided upon was 3/4° ( 63) . W4046 had now joined the trials, and the change was made on both airframes, since it was said that they 'ran out of trim' at 350mph EAS. Over the wide speed range now becoming accessible, the required lift coefficient and the wing incidence would fall substantially towards the upper end. The reduction of downwash would not compensate for the lower incidence of the tailplane (due to the fuselage axis becoming more nose-down), having the effect of progressively reducing the upload on the tail as speed increased. Gloster duly raised the tailplane settings, from their original value of 1° to the figure of 1°45', which is generally reported for the E28. At the low-speed end, this would not have required a large increment of stick-force to be applied to hold trim.
When W4046, shown in Fig. 12 , joined the trials at RAE, it made over 100 flights in three months. Most were flown by Sqn Ldr Douglas Davie, CO of the new turbine flight, who in due course began to report experiencing directional instability at speeds above 300mph (64) . As this had not occurred on W4041, there was much speculation as to the cause (65) . At one point, the rudders from the two aircraft were exchanged, but without appreciable effect. Nothing emerged that could account for different behaviour of the two airframes, but ultimately it was decided to increase the directional stability on both. It was said that the value of the appropriate 'weathercock' derivative n v (dimensionless rate of change of overall yawing moment with yaw) was too low. The result from the wind-tunnel tests was quoted to be about 0⋅023 per degree (though the actual value had been 0⋅032 (54) , which in 1940 had been considered by RAE to be 'satisfactory'). As in the case of longitudinal stability, there was a good theoretical basis for defining this, but a lack of required practical quantities such as the fuselage lateral moment and its derivative, and the fin efficiency and sidewash derivative in the wake of the tubby fuselage. With the very limited data available, a method such as that given by Diehl (27) could however have given Gloster results similar to those found in the wind-tunnel tests. Now an overall value of 0⋅060 was said to be 'usual', and RAE recommended an increase of 30% in the area of fin-plus-rudder to achieve this. In due course this was effected by fitting auxiliary fins, or finlets, to the tailplanes of both aircraft. These had the same outline as the fin/rudder, and were mounted outboard of the elevators, extending above and below the tailplane. One of them is visible in the view of W4041 in flight at RAE in Fig. 1 . It is not known whether this would have eliminated the snaking on W4046 reported by Davie, for soon after being returned to duty in July 1943 this aircraft was destroyed in an accident, following the jamming of controls at high altitude (4) . The adjustment to the tailplane setting and addition of the finlets had been made at the Gloster plant between March and May 1943. Some additional fixed trim tabs were attached at the same time. Remarkably, these seem to be the only modifications of an aerodynamic nature required to be made between the first flight of the E28 and preparation for its participation in high-speed diving trials at Farnborough in 1944. A Power Jets W2/500 engine was now installed in W4041, but curiously, the airframe log book, which has survived, also refers in two places to the 'NACA 230 series wing' being fitted at this time (66) . In view of other references, this must be a mistake, though puzzling, since an error of this consequence would hardly be expected to be made in the documents which should be definitive for an aircraft's history.
The main series of tests at RAE focused on the performance of the evolving sequence of engines, provided by Power Jets, the Rover Company and Rolls-Royce. From the beginning, these proved to behave in flight within a few percent of the predictions made by Whittle (60) . In its last trials at RAE, W4046 had been fitted with the W2B engine (having become the Rolls-Royce B23), and some aerobatic manoeuvres were undertaken, including bunts, barrel rolls, loops and stall turns (67) . The pilot, Sqn Ldr Charles McClure, found the loops to be 'quite normal and easy to do' and the rate of roll to be 'very good', requiring only small stick forces. the longitudinal stability being predicted to be more marginal than it turned out to be in practice. An alternative possibility, that the cg position had been somehow confused with the neutral point, is raised by the report of the RAE stability experts who had visited Glosters in January 1941, to advise on controls for the F9/40 Meteor (44) . Looking first at the stability of the E28, they reaffirm that its usable cg range would be between 0⋅24 and 0⋅31c, 'not 0⋅35, which was the neutral point'. But without further information, this comment remains somewhat enigmatic.
Although the early flights were made with the first (and only) flyable engine W1, giving a sea-level static thrust of just 860lb, a TAS of 338mph was recorded at 15,000ft. The results showed that the overall profile drag coefficient of the E28 was much as had been found in the wind-tunnel model tests. It was considered by the RAE analyst to be 'extremely small' (60) . Expressed in the form used from the earliest days of flight, the drag was given as '31lb at 100ft/sec', equivalent to a C Do of 0⋅018. This would be possible only if the transition on both surfaces of the wing had occurred well back from the leading edge, perhaps at about 20% of the chord, the rearward limit considered to be likely previously (45) . Following the first flights, W4041 was fitted with the W1A engine, having an air-cooled turbine bearing, and the NACAsection wing was replaced by the 'high speed' EC-section (GW2) wing. The only noticeable difference in handling on returning to flight in February 1942 was a small increase in the stalling speed (4) , which would be expected from the lower maximum lift coefficient of the EC section. The overall pitching moments of the two wings were similar, and, although at a given lift coefficient the fuselage axis would be nearly 1° more nose-down, it appears that any change of trim was not noticeable. Only W4041 flew with both types of wing -W4046 came into service later, and was fitted with an EC section wing from the start. Even with the early engines that did not provide the promised thrust, the requirements of the Specification were soon exceeded, except for the initial rate of climb. In early 1942, RAE advised the firm that the E28 'may be cleared, as far as aero-elastic considerations are concerned, for diving to 450mph E.A.S.' (61) . The airframe was notably 'slippery', and on the occasions when it was escorted by front-line fighters, W4046 famously left behind both the accompanying Spitfires and a Typhoon (4) . No significant deficiences emerged in the company flight tests, which Carter could justifiably describe as 'outstandingly successful' (35) . At different times, the aircraft were transferred to Farnborough, for two series of tests, which were at first concerned mainly with validating the performance of the successive engines with which they were fitted. W4041 was flown by a considerable variety of pilots (Kershaw mentions 14 in the first series in the summer of 1943). To Eric Brown, who flew it 18 times at RAE, including on one of its last flights, and who had the experience of having flown more different types than any other pilot, it was 'delightfully simple', 'exciting' and 'wonderful' to fly (8) . Grp Capt Allen Wheeler, CO of Experimental Flying at RAE, found it 'quite the pleasantest to fly I have ever been in' (62) . All pilots were at first enthused by the 'complete absence of vibration and the low and constant noise level' of turbine-powered flight, and having engine controls consisting only of the throttle. But Wheeler also comments significantly that the aircraft 'appears correctly stable in all three axes at all speeds', that it 'handles beautifully in the air' and 'there is nothing tricky' about it.
Wheeler noted an 'absence of constant changes of trim' in the initial stages. However, by early 1943, it was considered that the tailplane setting on W4041 needed to be raised. Although the fitting of progressively heavier engines could have been a factor, Grierson reports that it was needed to counter 'a pronounced change of trim in a tail-heavy sense with increase in speed' (4) . Evidently, this passed beyond the scope of the adjustments that could be made (only on the ground), requiring the aircraft to be rebalanced. According to Grierson, the adjustment made to the tailplane setting was just 1/4°, but so small a change would have been hard to justify, and this is There had been some violent oscillations during recovery from a stall turn, when the rudder had jammed hard over and the ailerons had become very stiff. The rudder excursion was thought to be due to stalling at low speed, but seizing of controls had occurred before to some extent on both airframes, and it had been this that eventually led to the loss of W4046. An enquiry finally attributed it mainly to the results of differential contraction of the airframe relative to various control system components at low temperatures, the ensuing slackening allowing one or more chain links to ride up on their sprockets and foul the surrounding guards (68) . The highest true speed obtained in level flight at this time was 466mph at 10,000ft (66) , when a pilot who 'did not know that the engine was ungoverned' (4) moved the throttle to its full travel, taking the engine rotational speed beyond the specified limit. This figure is widely reported as the maximum level speed reached by the E28, though Jones gives one of 476mph on another flight with this engine (69) . With the installation of the W2/500, having a static thrust of 1,526lb, the E28 should have been enabled to demonstrate the full potential envisaged for it by Carter in 1939. However, this engine was found to be prone to surging at higher altitudes, so advantage could not be taken of the more favourable conditions there. Reports tend to concentrate on recording the engine performance, so aerodynamic factors are less often emphasised. In its Company trials, W4041 recorded a TAS of 449mph (70) at 25,000ft, but after its transfer to RAE a modification was made to the engine that displaced the onset of surging to higher altitudes, leading to a figure of 473mph being obtained at 32,500ft (71, 72) . Values given by RAE usually had all the necessary corrections applied to the raw ASI readings -for position error, ambient density and compressibility. It is less easy to tease out the TAS value from reports by Power Jets, where, for comparison with theoretical expectations, a further correction was made, to convert to the equivalent performance under the conditions of the ICAN Standard Atmosphere. Thus, Whittle quotes a figure from a Power Jets report on flights in May 1944 of 479⋅5mph at 33,560ft (73) , but examination shows this to be a conversion from the 473mph given by the RAE analysts. Another figure quoted by Whittle for performance with the W2/500 engine, is a top speed of 550mph, 'including compressibility'. Reference to the source document (74) shows that this is not an actual flight measurement, but a prediction by Power Jets staff of the maximum level speed, that was obtained by matching drag estimates for the E28 with consolidated thrust data for the engine. The meaning of Whittle's qualification 'including compressibility' is not apparent, since it is clearly stated that the drag data used do not include any allowance for this.
Within the extensive range of measurements made at this time was that of the pressure loss in the intake and internal ducting (72, 74) . When expressed as a fraction of the dynamic head of the air entering the duct, this was high when the aircraft was stationary, causing a loss of thrust amounting to 5 to 6% of the bench test value. Despite considerable scatter in the results, it was indicated that the loss fraction fell at first as the forward speed increased, then rose again to values somewhat greater than the static one. This is attributed to flow separation at the intake lip, which had been foreseen in the early stages of the design (26) , and noted in the windtunnel tests (54) . Fig. 13 shows part of a diagram from a Power Jets report, showing how the situation was envisaged (74) , but a theoretical basis for determining the streamlines had yet to be developed. Some ad hoc changes had been tried during the wind-tunnel tests (54) , and some further model tests were made in August 1943 (75) . These showed that the lowest pressure coefficient on the outer surface near the intake lip could be raised by a minor modification from about -0⋅7 to about -0⋅2, while a more substantial change of shape could raise it further, to less than -0⋅1. There is no record that any of this work led to changes being made to the aircraft, so presumably it was not felt likely that the higher suction value would lead to any significant adverse effects. at 36⋅000ft (84) . Whatever the actual speed had been on this occasion, it was high enough to induce the 'violent pitching' motion that was to be experienced in the extensive diving tests that followed. These were to represent a new departure in the life of the E28/39. No longer the vehicle for the pioneering turbojet flight trials, it was to be engaged in 'compressibility research' by 'diving to high Mach numbers'. Results of these trials were reviewed shortly after the end of the war by Thom et al (85) and Mair (86) . In preparation for this work, the control systems of W4041 were modified to ensure freedom from low-temperature jamming, and the fabric-covered control surfaces were replaced by metal-skinned ones. The aircraft taking part in the trials, of several types, were flown at a high level speed near to their ceiling, then nosed over into a power dive, typically at 45 o , but sometimes up to 60 o , which was held for a sufficient time for the speed to stabilise, before commencing a pull-out at 2 to 3g. Height was lost very rapidly, so with insufficient time for the pilot to record any instrument readings, a compehensive 'automatic observer' station was fitted. In the case of the E28, this consisted of three instrument panels, monitored by five robot cameras, mounted in the radio bay, perhaps the first time in which automatic data recording had been used on such a scale in flight.
New control problems began to be encountered with W4041 as the speed in the dives increased, at one point causing pitch oscillations between 0 and 4g. These were suppressed by blunting the trailing edges of the elevators (by the historic practice of cementing on lengths of 3/16 inch cord). The Mach number was progressively raised, until the highest value recorded for the E28 in these trials was reached, at M = 0⋅816. At this speed, in the dry language of the R&M by Thom et al (85) 'the aircraft became extremely difficult to handle, due to buffeting and general oscillations about all three flight axes'. This suggests that the speed and manoeuvre restrictions specified for the E28 were taken lightly by the pilots concerned. However, Whittle became anxious, and in June 1944 he protested to Sir Ralph Sorley (then Deputy Director of Research and Development at MAP) against the aircraft being used for these trials, insisting that it should revert to its 'original purpose as a flying test bed for Power Jets engines' (73) . In his reply, Sorley reported that the E28 had reached Mach numbers of 0⋅72 in level flight and 0⋅83 in a shallow dive, but also claimed that it 'gave no sign of the usual dangerous symptoms of compressibility trouble'. He referred to the great value of the trials, as the EC wing section of the E28 was being used also on the first service jet aircraft, the Meteor. Whittle replied that in that case there was a strong argument for having two or three more E28s made.
In the course of the diving trials, the researchers at RAE recorded the development of shock waves around the airframe of W4041, as the Mach number passed beyond 0⋅75. The starboard wing had been fitted out with a pitot rake to record the wake aft of the trailing edge (just visible in Fig. 14) , and with tappings around a test section to obtain the pressure distribution. The main cause of the drag rise was confirmed by the pressure-plotting to be the occurrence of shock waves, firstly on the upper surface at about 0⋅75 and then on the lower surface at 0⋅77. A region near the wing root was then fitted with wool tufts, observed by a sixth robot camera, to show the flow disturbance expected to be caused by these shocks. However, no major separations were seen, only a localised disturbance, behind the bulge on the top surface of the wing above the wheel bay. The drag rise was now supplemented by wave drag -energy loss across the shock waves, which could be detected by the outermost sensors of the pitot rake. Changes of trim and directional instabilities were thought to be due principally to the progressive changes and fluctuations of the pressure distribution over the wing. Although measurements were not made elsewhere on the airframe, comparison with accelerometer records showed that 'practically all of the drag rise of the aircraft is attributable to the wings', reflecting well on the decisions that had been made on the basis of Lock's speculations.
Summarising the outcome of the trials, Ackroyd notes that the Finally, the W2/700 engine was fitted, requiring W4041 to accommodate a static thrust 38% greater than allowed in the Specification, and a weight that had now grown by about 30% since its first flight. A Gloster analysis listed 32 points on the airframe at which the structural reserve factors were now less than 1 (76) . The Ministry nevertheless considered it to be essential to proceed with engine and flight trials, and RAE undertook a further review of the strength and stiffness of the airframe. As a result, it was advised that speeds were to be limited to 450mph below 10,000ft and 400mph above 20,000ft, with linear variation between. Normal acceleration was to be limited to 3⋅5g, and 'yawing and rolling were to be avoided as far as possible'. (77) . But once again, the full advantage of the engine could not be taken, as the rear fuselage structure did not allow the optimum jet pipe diameter to be used. However, the W2/700 was less prone to surging and was expected to give more reliable performance at altitude. Unfortunately, speed data are elusive. Whittle quotes a level speed of 526mph at 35,000ft (73) , again qualified by 'including compressibility'. But this too is a prediction, and used drag figures that did not include any compressibility effects (78) . However, using the method employed by Power Jets with actual drag data measured later in flight (as outlined below), it is found that speeds somewhat above 500mph should have been possible with this engine in level flight at altitude approaching the tropopause. The journal Flight reported that 'the most powerful unit installed was the W2/700, and with this a speed of 505mph was recorded at 30,000ft' (79) . This is a precise figure, but no confirmation of it has been located so far.
Figures reported for the maximum altitude reached by the E28 have to be revisited also. In the last of the Company's test flights of W4046 before it was returned to the RAE, Grierson had taken it to 41,600ft (4) . Here the climb was terminated due to the very low temperature and an impending shortage of fuel. A decision had been made in June 1940 that cabin heating would be designed, but 'not actually be provided in the first instance' (80) , despite the assertion in the Specification that 'In view of the altitude at which the aircraft is required to operate an efficient heating system is essential'. References to the design of the heating system recur in the design meeting papers, and it is shown fully installed in the Prototype Notes (37) . But records indicate that cabin heating was not made operational before the beginning of 1944 (81) . In its later trials that year, though without cabin pressurisation, W4041 was taken to more than 40,000ft by RAE pilots on several occasions. With a nett thrust/weight ratio now more than one-third at sea level, the E28 returned initial rates of climb of over 5,000ft/min (82) , which would have been outstanding at the time. Attempting an optimum climb on Flight No 4011 on 25 April, Sqn Ldr Moloney reached 25,000ft in six minutes, and went on to 42,710ft after 20 minutes. This seems to have been the highest altitude recorded for the E28, but had been terminated due to the low pressure in the cabin. The pilot noted that it had not been the aircraft's ceiling, with an estimated rate of climb of 1,000ft/min remaining (83) .
DIVING TESTS
In view of the intention of Carter and his team from the outset to design the E28 for operation in conditions where compressibility effects would be significant, it is appropriate to review its performance in that area. During the trials mentioned above, some high-speed dives had been recorded with W4041 during the return from high altitude. Sqn/Ldr Moloney reports that in passing through 33,000ft on the return from his maximum altitude test (Flight No 4011, 25 April), a Mach number of 0⋅83 had been reached, with 'no tendency to divert . . . either nose up or nose down' (83) . It is possible, however, that at that time, the thorough instrument calibrations for recording true Mach number had not yet been made. For that or some other reason, no subsequent reference has been found to the record of a descent from 41,500ft on 22 August, when 625mph, M = 0⋅93 was reported preservation (87) , it seems certain that it was never flown again with that wing, and the point was not proved.
As with most other aircraft in the trials, the E28 experienced a growing nose-down trim change as speed increased in the dive. There being no provision for trimming out this moment in flight, it had to be balanced by elevator, requiring a stick-force of up to 60lb from the pilot to effect recovery. In the flight measurements low-speed C Do value of the E28 had been 0⋅017, slightly lower than that of a Spitfire IX that also took part (15) . As M increased, its profile drag remained lower, at a given Mach number, than that of all other aircraft in the trials, except for a Meteor IV and another Spitfire. This was a Mk XI unarmed photo-reconnaissance aircraft, without the bulges on the top surface of the wings, where the ammunition bays were normally positioned, and modified with a fillet at the fin/tailplane junction to reduce the peak suction at that point. In R&M 2264, the primary source (85) , the low-speed C Do value found for the E28 is given more precisely as 0⋅0168. It is notable that the actual value determined in flight is close to that found with the wind-tunnel model and as estimated by 1939 methods in Table 2 above. Figure 15 shows the measured rise in the overall zero-lift profile drag coefficient with increasing Mach number (85) . Comparison with the drag of the other aircraft showed clearly the basic correctness of Lock's opinion, which had been applied in the design from the beginning, that using the lowest possible thickness/chord ratio for the wing would delay the onset of the drag rise most as M increased. But although this ratio was very similar for the E28 and the Spitfire, for M beyond 0⋅75, the drag coefficient for the Spitfire rose less. The aerofoil section on the Spitfire -from the NACA 220 series -did not have the rearward position of the maximum thickness suggested by Relf's work, and from this, together with captured German data, new thinking began to emerge about sections for high subsonic flight. Thom et al (84) conjectured that the 'high-speed' EC profile, while undoubtedly delaying the onset of significant compressibility effects, might have experienced a steeper rise in drag once these developed. To explore this, RAE would have liked to conduct further tests with the E28, in which the original NACA-section wing had been restored. (This further refutes the indication in the aircraft's flight log that this wing was already in place). Although it was in fact re-fitted later, when W4041 was returned to the condition of its first flight, prior to its BRINKWORTH ON THE AERODYNAMICS OF THE GLOSTER E28/39 323 handling, here attributed largely to lack of data on fuselage moment derivatives at the time of the design. But its aerodynamic features enabled it to go further, to take on the different role of research vehicle for flight at high subsonic speeds. Its Specification having contained a reference to compressibility for the first time, the Gloster team had interacted closely with researchers from the beginning, making pragmatic use of the very limited and uncertain information available on this in 1939. In the brief period in which its aerodynamic design had to be settled, they conceived a synthesis of the material with the best of current practice that provided a vehicle well suited to leading the way into a new phase of aeronautics. Giving exceptional returns of performance over a wide range of flight conditions, the E28/39 came to be seen finally as 'one of the most successful research aircraft ever built in the United Kingdom' (88) .
ENVOI : WILFRED GEORGE CARTER
Responsibility for the aerodynamic design of the Gloster E28/39 lay ultimately with George Carter, as its Chief Designer. At his death in 1969, a brief obituary gave only one sentence to the project (89) , but seemingly a modest man, he might have thought it enough. Writing of the challenge he had faced in 1939, he presented the entry into 'the almost unexplored region of high subsonic speed' as just 'a very intriguing proposition' (35) . Frank Whittle came to the view, in the same reference, that 'E28/39, like the engine which powered it, was born of sweat, toil and teamwork'. There was certainly close interaction between Whittle and Carter, their respective teams and the research staffs of the RAE and NPL. In the central position, Carter had to show sound foresight in devising a synthesis of their various contributions.
Mere chance had brought him this opportunity to open the way into a new era of flight, but he evidently possessed the requisite qualities to seize the task. He combined an immediate appreciation of the possibilities afforded by the new means of propulsion with an understanding of the emerging ideas on handling compressibility, ensuring that the resulting aircraft would be much more than a vehicle for putting the jet engine into the air. In a very short time, the team he directed produced a real gem of a design, one that was to prove equal to the severest tests. The impression that arises from the available records is of a well-led and thoughtfully professional process throughout. Carter's main attention soon had to move on, to the conception of a combat aircraft that might be able to influence the outcome of the war. He was to have further triumphs, and more than a few disappointments. But by their outcome, his early decisions on the E28/39 surely showed that elusive quality of good judgment, which deserves to be recognised and remembered. BJB reported by Thom et al (85) , there was a distinct rearward movement of the centre of pressure on the wing, though more pronounced effects such as shock-induced separation had not been observed up to the highest Mach number of 0⋅81. However, the overall trim change for the aircraft as a whole in a dive was attributed by Mair mainly to an accompanying change -an increased lift of the tail (86) . This was due to the steeper airframe attitude required, to enable the wing to compensate for the falling lift coefficient as the Mach number rose. He showed that this effect would generally predominate over that of the changing pressure distribution on the wing, at least up to the limit of reliable data, then around M = 0⋅85.
Incidence meters showed that some limited aeroelastic distortion was occurring on the E28, but there seems to have been no anxiety that the aircraft was approaching the condition of an irreversible 'tuck under' that was later to be a serious problem with some types from this cause. This was perhaps the reason for Sir Ralph Sorley's assertion that E28 did not experience 'the usual dangerous symptoms of compressibility troubles'. Further, due to the forward position Carter had chosen for the fin, the peak suction on it did not coincide with that on the tailplane, so that shock stall on the empennage would have been delayed. In this connection, it is of interest to note that as early as May 1940, Richard Walker had recorded a remark made by John Lobley, after a visit to Farnborough, that 'Tail shock stall in dive causes elr (elevator) reversal -pull out impossible' (21) . (The origin of this information at so early a time is not recorded, but it might have had some influence in the choice of the layout of the empennage).
As it was small and its structures relatively stiff, trim changes on the E28 were neither too large to be held by the pilot, nor enhanced much by aeroelastic effects. After three momentous years of engine test flying, it had thus proved to be equal to its second task as a high-speed research vehicle. Although more work with it had been planned, W4041 was finally withdrawn from use in March 1945, to be moved for preservation to the Science Museum the following year (8) . As seen in Fig. 16 , it remains in good order, having been quite robust enough to withstand the heavy battering it experienced, in being taken far into flight conditions that could not have been envisaged when its Specification was being written.
CONCLUSION
The E28/39 quickly fulfilled its initial purpose, to demonstrate the practicality of jet propulsion, and went on to be a vital tool in the early development of turbine engines. The many pilots who flew it found it easy and pleasant to fly, with only minor deficiences in
